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Kansas Open Books Preface
This book addresses the tension between two hallmarks of the liberal polity: the
values of autonomy and diversity. Personal autonomy I equate with individual
choice based upon the capacity for critical reflection on one ’s projects and goals.
Diversity requires a plurality of options among which individuals may choose.
Becoming free thus requires both a variety of external resources that afford choice
and an array of internal resources that enable critical reflection on the options
with which individuals are confronted. Autonomy is challenged, on the one hand,
when cultural or religious groups prioritize unquestioning obedience to authority over the ability to engage in this reflection. Liberal hospitality to diversity is
challenged, on the other hand, when we either implicitly or explicitly discourage
these groups from inculcating their own values, some of which may foreclose the
development of the capacity for autonomy.
Although liberalism is often described as neutral among rival conceptions of
the good, it cannot be neutral among all possible such conceptions. It is nonneutral in that it should encourage the development of the capacity for autonomy in
all individuals, even if some then choose to live nonautonomous lives. It should
be neutral, however, as to individuals’ actual choices, so long as these do not rule
out or interfere with the development of the capacity for autonomy in others. In
any case, neutrality is not self-defining but must be measured by some standard
independent of neutrality itself. The book explores this tension in several areas
with particular attention to what it means to choose or affirm a way of life.
Regarding national citizenship, any political community must exercise some
control over its boundaries if it is to remain an entity within which it may practice
its animating principles. The exponential increase in migration and immigration
over the last two decades and the current growth of restrictive policies, however,
have highlighted in stark terms the question of what membership in a polity is or
should mean. Becoming Free argues that because a political community is a type
of expressive association, it may exclude some who wish to join. Those whom it
admits or allows to remain, however, should be treated as members or eventual
members of the polity.
Yet, citizenship is less essential than it formerly was as a source of rights and
ix
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benefits. Peter Spiro (2008, 19–25, 31, 52), for example, suggests that in a period
of increasing mobility and growing acceptance of multiple citizenship, birthright
citizenship is both overinclusive and underinclusive. Individuals who are born in
the United States may experience few inclusive ties here, while others may claim
strong ties to the culture but lack the automatic status of birthright citizenship. Is
citizenship a matter of will or of fact? Perhaps de facto membership in a community through social ties is what should eventually earn individuals the de jure status
of citizenship. Joseph Carens (2013, 158–169) persuasively argues for a theory of
social membership, according to which attachments within a community deepen
over time and thus provide a foundation for moral claims to many legal rights.
These rights are membership-specific to particular political communities, but they
underpin the claims of members who are citizens and noncitizens alike. The liberal
principle of consent, typically associated with choice and empowerment, may become a tool of exclusion when wielded by sovereign states, whereas the ascriptive
aspect of social membership may increase the possibility of inclusion.
Among other interesting contributions to the debate over the meaning of membership and citizenship is Jacqueline Stevens (2010), who criticizes birthright citizenship as incompatible with the liberal values of choice and merit. Ana Tanasoca
(2018) argues that multiple citizenship undermines the democratic legitimacy of
collective decision-making and should therefore be an active rather than a passive
choice. Tanasoca would unbundle political rights from citizenship: individuals
would exercise political rights only in states of residence. Finally, Lindsey Kingston
(2019) suggests that although national citizenship is still an important grounding for
human rights, it is insufficient. Individuals also need entitlements to home and belonging and the provision of opportunities to pursue and actualize their goals if they
are to enjoy true membership in a political community. All these writers move the
debate forward regarding what should define national citizenship, both externally
and internally. Moreover, they address either explicitly or implicitly the tension between choices made by migrants and those made by nation-states to which they may
migrate. I believe that there is still a place for birthright citizenship at a time of so
much migratory upheaval.
Even a bounded national community is not monolithic. Any nation-state reflects a particular cultural and/or ethnic mixture. The background conditions for
individual and group interactions within it, therefore, cannot reflect neutrality.
The book addresses varying responses to cultural diversity as a context for individual choice based on critical reflection. Many individuals are born into distinctive cultures, such as indigenous groups that want protection as such, but in
which individual membership is thus unchosen. Is members’ future autonomy
best protected by the legal preservation of a cultural structure whose content may
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be altered by individual choices over time? Or is it better protected by the individual right to leave cultures whose freedom of association allows these groups to
maintain their cultural content over the objections of some of their members? The
existence of background conditions that maximize the chances that, for mature
adults, cultural membership will be an expression of autonomy is crucial. Even
those who remain in their original cultures will, one hopes, affirm their membership after critical examination of their projects and goals.
Although I address ethnicity and gender separately from cultural membership,
the central issues are related. Ethnic minorities and women typically wish to be
full members of the larger society, yet they may retain and often seek recognition
of certain features of their identities that may diverge from what is considered
the norm. What is key is that individual self-interpretation of who one is cannot
be subordinated to imperatives defined by others. Some aspects of the public culture are required by liberal democratic principles, some are optional and therefore permissible, and others are alien and should be forbidden. Regarding what
should be permissible, one thinks of both cultural and religious choices such as
the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women. As of this writing, moreover, the
U.S. Supreme Court has just heard arguments as to whether a transgender woman
should be able to present as a woman in a job where she had previously worked
when presenting in accordance with her biologically male sex. We can choose
neither our ethnicity nor our biological sex. But we can exercise choice about how
we want these features to function in the contexts of our own lives, whether this
means assimilation to typical norms or the claiming of difference as essential to
our self-interpretations.
Culture, ethnicity, and gender all potentially fit under the rubric of what Alan
Patten (2014) terms neutrality of treatment, as distinguished from neutrality of aim
or of effect. Policies provide neutral treatment if they are not more accommodating of some conceptions of the good than of others. Although this is not the
place to discuss Patten in detail, I agree with him that neutrality is a “downstream
value” (108). That is, it does not mandate a particular outcome, but is instrumental
in providing all individuals with fair opportunities for self-determination (29–31,
137–138). This formulation may require cultural rights under some definition in
particular circumstances but not in others. Thus, cultural rights also function as a
downstream value, derivative from neutrality of treatment—which is an instance
of neutrality for nonneutral reasons. Neutrality, once again, must be measured by
some standard independent of neutrality itself.
Religious affiliation is a type of cultural membership in which members of a
particular group are generally expected to adhere to its stated beliefs and practices
as a condition of continued membership. Because every nation-state necessarily
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takes a particular stance toward religious belief, this precludes religious neutrality
by structuring the context within which individuals engage in critical scrutiny,
survey their options, and either revise or reaffirm their allegiances. Some view
freedom of conscience as the ability to act in accordance with the duties mandated by one’s beliefs without interference; others see this freedom as the ability
to choose one’s beliefs without interference and as rooted in the capacity for autonomy. I subscribe to Yael Tamir’s (1993) characterization of constitutive choice,
wherein individuals choose or affirm membership in a religion or culture which
they then view as imposing particular duties upon them. From this viewpoint,
an individual chooses or affirms an allegiance that becomes partly constitutive of
identity. In sum, encumbrance and choice are not mutually exclusive groundings
for freedom of conscience.
Over the last two decades, however, the free exercise of religion has become
increasingly interpreted not only to suggest constitutive choice regarding the obligations of one’s own life but also to mandate duties the execution of which interfere with others living their own lives as their conscientious beliefs suggest (Gill
2019). Greater religious diversity and increasing recognition of the rights of sexual minorities has led some individuals and groups to feel threatened. Honoring
free exercise has been thought to require not only the negative liberty of freedom
from interference but also a positive governmental obligation to ensure the conditions of religious flourishing. Within this framework, public neutrality toward
religion requires that religious organizations secure access to public benefits such
as funding equal to that for which secular organizations are eligible. Although
public funding has been available to separately incorporated components of religious organizations that eschew proselytization and discrimination in hiring, the
administration of President Donald Trump seeks to abolish these requirements,
and the Supreme Court as constituted in 2019 may move in this direction.
The court has blessed a broader interpretation of free exercise in 2014 through
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, allowing for-profit corporations to limit contraceptives in employee health plans on the basis of the business owners’ beliefs, and in
2018 through Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, allowing a
bakeshop owner in the stream of commerce to decline to create a cake to celebrate
a same-sex wedding. I view these developments as infringements on the autonomy of individuals to live their lives on the basis of critical examination of their
own identities. The government of any polity should designate a sphere within
which it will not interfere with people’s lives. Although religious individuals and
groups should exercise their convictions within their areas of competence, in a
liberal society and state they cannot be allowed to define for themselves the limits
of these areas (Laborde 2017, 171–196).
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Private voluntary associations that do not receive public funds should be free to
set their own membership terms, unless most associations were to exclude the same
groups of people in ways that limit these individuals’ autonomy, as with the regime
of Jim Crow in the South. Becoming Free supports the Boy Scouts of America in
excluding gay scoutmasters, and we have seen that the Scouts eventually decided
to admit gay scoutmasters and scouts as well as transgender scouts. Interestingly,
Clare Chambers (2017) argues that religious membership, unlike that in voluntary associations, does not often flow from choice, as religions encourage adult
members to bring up children in accordance with their tenets. Therefore, religious
groups are not formed through free association and should be more restricted than
private members’ clubs (182). In her view, they should be allowed to discriminate
within a given group only if they confine themselves to adult members who consent to that policy. Exemptions that ostensibly protect religious groups discriminate
against members who may be forced out and reinforce the dominant consensus. As
with cultural groups, how best to provide a context for autonomous choice is less
clear than it may appear.
In Becoming Free, I argue that because sexual orientation, like cultural membership and religious faith, is critically important to personal identity, individuals
who engage in acceptable practices—those that do not harm others—in all of
these areas should be accorded the same measure of consideration and respect.
The degree to which same-sex attraction, or for that matter gender identity, is
a choice does not matter in the end. Conservatives may be more accepting of
sexual orientation and gender identity they understand as unchosen, whereas progressives may be more sympathetic toward religious faith that does appear to be
chosen, as in some conversion experiences. But if we respect religious identity as
a potential expression of autonomy, we should similarly respect sexual orientation
and gender identity.
Although there is currently no uniform protection in the United States against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, marriage
equality is now the law of the land nationwide. United States v. Windsor (2013)
ruled that failure to recognize same-sex marriages in states where it was available violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015) declared that a fundamental right to marry was guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that therefore the marriages of same-sex couples must be recognized on the same terms and
conditions as those of traditional couples.
I have since argued (Gill 2012) that marriage equality for same-sex couples
can be defended through the religion clauses of the First Amendment. The government recognizing the commitment of only one type of couple is akin to the
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government recognizing only one type of religion. Similarly, some couples hold
deeply conscientious beliefs that they ought to be married, not simply in private
commitment ceremonies that carry no legal import, but with the respect and civic
standing that accompany the institution of civil marriage. Denial can be equated
with denying the free exercise of conscientious belief and practice, especially when
this prohibition has been conditioned upon a sectarian definition of marriage.
Unsurprisingly, the opening of civil marriage to same-sex couples has prompted
interest in what marriage, now recognized by many as a socially constructed institution, should mean in the liberal polity. Civil marriage may be seen as perfectionistic, valorizing one type of relationship over others when the liberal polity should
be neutral among rival conceptions of the good (Bedi 2013). Some commentators argue that the state must recognize and support all types of relationships if
it recognizes any, or that civil marriage should be divided among its component
functions, some of which may be supported or regulated by the state (Polikoff
2008, Metz 2010, Brake 2012, Chambers 2017). I believe that marriage should be
retained as a civil institution at least as one option among others, rather than as the
only legitimate option. If it can be presented as instrumental to goods that many
desire rather than as a morally preferable way of life on intrinsic grounds, the state
is not abandoning neutrality—that is, neutrality based on maximizing autonomy
as an informed choice among one’s options. Regarding plural relationships or
plural marriage, opposition is often based on hostility similar to longtime opposition to same-sex marriage rather than upon reasoned considerations. I believe that
it is abuses such as coercion and underage intimacies that should be opposed and
prosecuted, issues often found in the mainstream, rather than the relationships
themselves. This point may be reinforced by the recognition that such relationships engender the most animus when they are held out as marriage and privately
formalized on the basis of religious belief.
The final chapter addresses civic education in the liberal polity. Some liberal
theorists believe that education for autonomy and individuality instantiates a comprehensive value or a vision of the good for the whole of life. It is therefore too
exclusive to be fostered in citizens, many of whom do not value critical reflection.
The civic respect necessary for liberal democratic citizenship in a diverse polity,
however, requires imaginative engagement with other ways of life, and this activity in turn requires the capacity to engage in critical reflection on one ’s projects
and goals. Because the liberal polity should not exert pressure at the first-order
level of actual choice, even if some choose nonautonomous lives, its role at the
second-order level of how choices are made is crucial. Simultaneously, however,
even those who are fluent in critical self-reflection need to understand the contingent character of their own commitments, and to imagine how others may be
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committed to alternative ideals, projects, and goals, even those who eschew this
reflection.
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift (2014) have more recently argued that although adults have a right to parent, parents’ rights are fiduciary ones and are
entirely derived from and justified by appeal to children’s interests. Parents may
confer some economic advantages upon their children and shape some of their
values, but they should do so much less extensively than parents currently believe. The advantages and values that parents may transmit are instrumental to
the relationship, not intrinsically valuable. This approach, they suggest, would
produce greater equality that need not conflict with family values. Peter Strandbrink (2017), however, argues that although the liberal democratic model of civic
education purports to instill universal values such as diversity and tolerance, the
nature of political power ensures that the instantiation of these values will always
reflect the cultural contexts within which these values are taught. Additionally, the
more that liberal democratic societies seek to instill seemingly universal values,
the closer they approach comprehensive liberalism and thus ironically become
illiberal or at least parochial in nature. These two contributions to the literature
on civic education serve as interesting bookends to a wide range of viewpoints.
All the topics addressed in this book reflect tensions between the promotion
of the capacity for autonomy and traditional liberal hospitality to diversity. It is
gratifying that these issues continue to be debated, and I expect that discussion
will continue for a long time to come.
Emily R. Gill
Peoria, IL
December 2019
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